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Abstract 
Rationality is an important concept in Art.ificial Intelligence and 
Philosophy. When artificial systems are considered to be intelli-
gent or autonomous, it is almost obligatory to attribute intentions 
and beliefs to them. The currently dominant view of intentions 
sees them as involving commitments on the part of the agents 
who have them. · But t.he notion of commitment seems to clash 
with the notion of rationality. It is argued that this need not be 
so. Commitments are only appropriate for ag~nts with a limit.ed 
capacity to reason. A treatment of commitment has been previ-
ously proposed that reconciles them with rationality. Here further 
motivations for the commitments of limited agents are discussed. 
This analysis is extended to account for the so-called precommit-
ments , which have been excluded by others a.s introducing too 
much complexity. 
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1 Introduct ion 
Rationality is a key concept in AI and related disciplines, including, Eco-
nomics, Philosophy and Psychology. It provides a powerful abstraction with 
which to view intelligent agents, independent of their internal architecture 
and with minimal knowledge about thein. Dennett sees the attribution of 
rationality as the central step in adopting the intentional stance [Dennett, 
1987]. While agents who are sufficiently autonomous may ad in any way 
they please, with rational agents you have a pretty good idea of how they 
will proceed, if you know what situation they are in. Rationality constrains 
the options available to an agent to a small set. This makes it possible to 
predict with some accuracy, at least. in principle, the behavior of rational 
agen ts and to ascri be intentions and beliefs to them reliably. If one could 
design and implement rational agents, one would be a long way along imple-
menting truly intelligent systems . Un"fortunately, an assumption usually not 
Hoted in .the literature on rationality is that real-life agents must necessarily 
be finite in several respects, among them their ability to compute complex 
functions under time constraints. Such computations would, in general, be 
required to take rational decisions. 
It is now quite standard ill AI and some parts of the related disciplines to 
note that real-life agents are limited. If rationality is taken as the ability to 
act effectively despite Olles limitations in deciding optimal courses of action, 
even limited agents can be rational, though not so in the traditional sense. 
There is now a need for descriptive and prescriptive theories of rationality 
in limited agents. A descriptive theory would consider existing intelligent 
systems, primarily humans , and describe how they manage to cope despite 
.their limitations; a prescriptive theory would define criteria by which an 
agent may be designed that exhibits intelligence despite its limitations. This 
paper considers in a new light some recent descriptive proposals that suggest 
that humans adopt and hold commitments to the tasks they intend to clo. 
The resulting theory also makes prescriptive sense as an ahstract analysis for 
limited agents. 
Intentions, along with beliefs and desires, are an important. component of 
the folk psychological concept.s of intelligence and agency, especially as these 
concepts are used in AI. Specifically, intentiolls and reasoning about inten-
tions are a crucial part of many important subareas of AI-e.g., planning 
[Georgeff, 1987; McDermott, 1982], plan recognition [Pollack, 1986], natural 
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language understanding [Grosz and Sidner, 1988] and multiagent systems 
[Singh, 1991c].Perhaps the salient property of future-directed intentions is 
that they involve commitment 011 the part of agents. This view has been 
gaining ground in the philosophical and AI literatures recently [Bratman, 
1987, ch. 2J [Harman, 1986, p. 94J [Cohen and Levesque, 1990, p. 217J. The 
idea here is that an agent who has an iutention is in some way committed to 
it-BOt only does he intend to achieve the relevant condition right now, but 
would also intend to achieve it later, even as the circumsta.nces changed, per-
haps for the worse. Thus there is some irrationality built into the very idea 
of commitment. Yet there are philosophical as well as practica.l advantages 
to this view. ",Thile it admits present-directed intentions, e.g., for actions 
being done int.entionally now, it. gi"es primacy to future-directed ones. This 
is important from a philosophical point of view because it allows au agent's 
intentional state now to influence his actions later, in a way that the be-
havioristically minded philosophers of yore would have found unacceptable 
[Bl'at.man, 1987, p. 6]. \Vheu conceived of as involving cOlUmitments, future-
directed intentions allow an agent to coordinate his activities, both with 
his other acti vi ties, and with those of other agents. This is also practically 
important since it simplifies t.he design and analysis of complex ageuts, an 
importan t issue in AI. 
The commitment-based view of intentions suggests that an agent recon-
sider his intentions only occasionally, rather than at every step. This allows 
even a computationally and perceptually limited agent to carryon fairly ef-
fectively in a world that, relative to his capacities, is highly comi)lex and 
changing rapidly. I take this much a,s granted in this paper, and focus on the 
issue of how the notion of commitment can be understood in AI. 
In §2, I describe the not-ioll of comnlitment as applied to intentions and 
how it seems to conflict with the notion of agent rationality. In §3, I present 
my own intuitions about commitment; in §4, I extend them to precol11mit-
ment.. In §5, I explain the ontological framework and primitives used here. 
In §6, I formalize commitment and in §7 precommitment. The approach pre-
sented here is independent of the exa.ct semantics given to intentions- be it 
possible worlds based, sentential or any other. 
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2 Commitment 
Following Bratman and Harman, I ('onsider a mental notion of commitment, 
rather than a social one- an agent is committed to his intentions privately, 
not to anyone else. This kind of psychological commitment is to be distin-
guished from social commitment (to which it is intimately related, however). 
Commitment. entails that the agent cont.iuue to hold on to his intentions over 
time, even as things get worse. I.e., an agent who is committed to his inten-
tions would try to achieve it again, if his initial attempt was unsuccessful, 
and possibly try several times. If the circumstances change for the worse, he 
might try harder, i.e., spend more energy and time on it. E.g., if you are 
('ommitted to being at t he airport. at 6:00pm, you would make more than 
OBe at.tempt to hail a. taxi; if no taxis are forthcoming you might walk t.o a 
better lo('ation, rent a car, or request. a friend for a ride, alld so 011. 
One of the reasons given to justify' the fact that agents are committed 
t.o their ill.tentions, and that our theories should admit that agents are so 
('omllliUed, is t.hat comlllit.mC'ntl:! hdp limited agents pursue complex goa.ls 
that would otherwise be beyond their capacities. Thus , while commitments 
might prove quite irrational in some cases (e.g., where they lead the agent to 
do actions that are too expensive, or whose side-effeds are too dam.aging), 
overall, in at least ordinary circulllstances, they are quite rational for agents 
who cannot think fast enough on the fly. E.g., while your commitment to be 
at the airport might make you hijack a bus there (something that you might 
regret the rest of your life) , such cases of over-commitment are rare (or ought 
to be rare among rational agents) . However , having that commitment saved 
you from repeatedly planning during the day to be in a neighborhood cafe 
a.t 6:00pm. 
The philosophical intuit.ions here are that (1) if you do not know too uluch 
about the future state of the world, and have too little time to think, then, 
on the average, ('omuutments are a good way of being able to get something 
done; and (2) while you may have commitments, it is not a good idea t.o 
over-('olllmit. Extant theories seem to suggest that an agent ought to be 
committed to an intention only as long as it is beneficial and ought to give 
it up as soon as it is not. But then, if the agent has to decide whether a 
gi yen intentioll is beneficial or not repeatedly, the ('oncept of commitment is 
both descriptively and prescriptively redundant- the agent can just do the 
optimal action at each moment (see [Singh, 1991a] for a detailed discussion). 
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However, commitments are usefu l when (1) the agent cannot switch tasks 
quickly; (2) .the cost of reasoning is high; (3) the agent cannot consider all 
relevant aspects of the world on the fly; or (4) the agent has a pretty good 
model of t.he world, so that the losses of opportunity are limited. 
3 Conative Entrenchment 
Iuteutions are at.Lit.udes of rational agents. However, being rational does BOt. 
entail having unlimited computational power; it just entails being able to 
use ones resources effectively. For agents who are limited, but are rational 
to some extent, having a COlllluitmeut is a meaus of making the effort and 
tittle speut on deliberation have a IOllger t.erm effect than on just the curn-'Ilt 
action- if an agent can commit to an intention or a course of actioll, he doC's 
not have to repeatedly rethink some issues from first principles. By thus 
COlllllliLLillg. the agellt would certa.iuly llliss out some opportuuities (,hat he 
could have noticed by rethinking, but this comes at the ach·ant.age of not 
haviug beell swamped by intentiou:> to deliberate on. In many case:>. careful 
deli beration once in a whi le is better than poor reasoning done repeatedly. 
A useful consequence of commitments from an AI designer's point. of 
view is that they allow a more modular design t.han is otherwise possible. 
The designer has simply to ensure t.hat the agents being designed have the 
appropriate commit.ments at. cert.ain times or in certain situations. At the 
lIext lower level of the design, he lllust supply a set of means for ensuring 
that the commit.ments are met. The interactions between the processes of 
deliberating about commitment.s and the processes for acting up to t.hem can 
t.hus be streamlined . To a large ext.ent, desigll of the commitment layer call 
be carried out independently of the lower layer. 
The main advantage of commitments from the agents' point of view is 
that, at least in the long run, the limited agent ought. to come out ahead in 
t.erm:> of ("[or(, expended a.ud beuefits accrued . This is why agent.:> who ha.v(-' 
intentions, i.e., deliberate about. adopt, act on, and drop them, do pretty 
well despite their other limit.ations. That an agent can actually succeed in 
t.he world has to do wit.h t.he nature of t.he world and the design of the 
agellt. relat.ive t.o it. The relevClIlt. parts of t.he world change slowly, anel 
are sufficiently stable so tha.t a.gents can monitor them in sufficiently large 
intervals; well-designed agents a.re able to monitor the relevant parts of the 
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reality t.hat would affect them, and so on. 
Given that. commitm.ent.s are a good idea for the kinds of agent.s and envi-
ronments that we are considering, on~ can naturally focus on the normative 
criteria for determining how commit.ted an agent should be to an intention 
of his. Now the commitment of an agent to an intention is really a measure 
of t.he effort he is willing to put in to achieve it, or of the risk he is willing 
to take in t.rying to achieve it , or of something along those lines. Thus it 
is only reasonable that. idea.lly the commitment of an agent to an intent.ion 
should depend on its utility to him, "utility" here being a normative concept. 
For a real-life agent , the commitment would actually have to be set equal 
to the ut.ility he subjectively expects from the intention . This approach bas 
an advant.age in that once an agent has adopted an intention and decided 
his level of commitment for it. he does not have t.o repeatedly reconsider 
his cOlllmit.ment.- he would lIeed to l'econsider it only when he had put in 
effort for it well above his initial commitment, or had tried all the sufficiently 
low-risk (I.nd low-cost means he knows of. At that point he could either drop 
the intention altogether or reinstate it with a. new commitment. Thus, the 
greater the agent 's commitment. to au intention, the less frequently he would 
need to recon:;ider ii.. To coin a phrase analogous to the one well-known for 
beliefs, an agent. 's commit.ment to an intent.ion is a m.easure of its eona/i'llf' 
fll/rfllehm en!. Note that this account is not entirely accurate for ag<'nts who 
can change their value systems; however, such changes should automatically 
lead to a reconsideration of all relevant intentions. Here T consider only the 
sense of conative entrenchment in which the expected utilit.y of an intention 
is involved (rather than risk , or SOllle other such potentially useful criterion) . 
4 Precommitment 
While Brat.man presents a commitment-based analysis of intentions, he ex-
plicit.ly rules out cases of what he calls precommdmenf. An agent is pre-
commi t ted to adopting (or not adopting) an intention if he has decided in 
advance that. he will (or will not.) adopt. that intent.ion . An agent may adopt. 
a precommit.ment. because he want.s t.o ensure t.hat he will not, in the heat of 
the moment as it were, make t.he wrong decision; e.g., an ageut may prevent 
himself from adopting the intention of eating something from his refrigerator 
by locking it. up and t.hen throwing away the key. Bratman seems to t.hink 
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t.hat considerations of precommit.ment. would complicate the relationship be-
t Wf'f'1I intentions and ratiollal i t.y. Possi bly, t.hey would do so sligh tly. 
It seems t.o me, however, that preconunitment is just another example of 
how a limited agent may try to act rationally. By precommitting to a course 
of action. t.hf' agent. makes t.hf' rf'sults of his careful reasoning carry through 
longer. An ice-cream addict can save himself a lot of t.rouble by makillg 
iCf'-('re'ams incollvellif'nt, or illlpossiblf' , 1.0 obtain. Precommitment.s of t.his 
sort. Sf;"("lll to h(" a cRllonical \Va.,' ill which liluil,ed agent.s 11lay marshal t.heir 
r(-'sou rces for del il)f'ration all d prevC'nt t.hf'l11sf'1 Ve'S from b e'j IIg oVe'rw 11<.'111 wc\ 
by a complex and rapidly changing world in which their unconsiderf'd actions 
would usually be subopt.imal. 
One way in which an agcllt. lllay adopt a precommitnwnt is by taking out. a 
side bd. t.o do as he /lOW t.hinks is right. While t.his ide'a Ilnnecessarily involve'S 
t.he notion of social commit.ment.s among agent.s. it yields the right metaphor 
with which to think of precollllllit.1llent.. Pre('olllmitments just lllake the 
corresponding intent.ions ('asier or iJardcr t.o adopt. vVlwn. as suggest.ed in 
§:3. c0l11111it.l1lellt.s are t.h('mselves analyzed as t.he resources allocat.ed to all 
intention. this makes for a simple treatment. of precommitments as well. They 
Illay l)f' taken as (J) t.he amOU1lt. (positive or Ilf'gative) that lllust. be added 
t.o t.Ilf' utility t.hat would hav(' bee'11 computed at fun-t.ime to yield the' actual 
cOlllmitmellt, or as (:~) the millilllUlll commitment that the agent is allowed 
to have t.o the given task thell. 
Whilf' connnitment. simplici/f'" seems irrational only duriug t.1lf' int.ervals 
that an agent does not deliberate in. precol1uuitment seems quite blatantly 
irrat.ional eVf'11 from the agent 's point of view while Iw deliberates. That. 
is, t.he agent. may know that rf'lat.ive to his beliefs about the ut.ilit.y of t.Iw 
givell t.ask what his commit.IIlP1I1. sllOuld be and yet may cOlllmil. lllore or 
less resourcC's to it. The agent. appf'ars internally:--i.e., even illt.rospect.iYely, 
illcollsist.f'llt and irratiollal. Hmvf>vel', t.his SellSf' of bla.1.au1. irratiollality is 
tplllp('J'pd by the knowledge that t.Jw agent would bave about. his lilllitatious. 
Ir til(-' agf'llt kIlows Jw is Jilllit.f'd. Ilf' might prf'ff'r his carf'fuJ thought. t.o his 
rushed pvaluations, even if t.he former were based on dated information or 
on predictiolls that turned out to Iw false. Thus precoJl1mitl1lent.s are useful 
whell (1) t,h(' agent's tasks <11'f' dea.r cut., so lw has to do t.helll anyway; (2) 
t.he agf'llt. is a poor reasoner ullder t.ime pressure; or (:3) thf' agent has to COI1\-
lllit to oLller agents about his adiolls ill advance. vVhile COlllluitlllf:'Ilt.S hold 
ollly up t.o LIlt' Hex I, deli beratioll. prpt'olllllli tlllell ts persist through ord illary 
deli berations and can influence them. I come back to this point in §8. 
For concreteness, I llOW tum to an informal discussion of a formal model 
, in wllich intentions and commitments can be formalized. This model is quite 
ab!)tract, is df:'rivf:'d from model::; for dYllamic and branchiug time t.emporal 
logics. has previollsly been developed. a.nd has been applied to the forllla.l-
ization of intentions and know-how [Siligh, 1!)91b; Singh and Asher, 1990J. 
I follow the presentation of [Singh, 1991a], where it was used to formalize 
!)Ollle po!)tulate!) conc('l'uiug COllllllit.l1l<:'Ilt.S . 
5 Intuitive Description of Model 
and Primit ive Concepts 
We Heed a formal model that involves time, action, possibility and choice and 
allows SOllle notion of probability so that expected utility may be formalized 
(see [Sillgh, L991aJ for det.ails). The model used here is based Oll possible 
worlds. Each possible world has a branching history of limfs. Hist.ories are 
sets of times. partially ordered by temporal precedence. <. They branch into 
the future, and are assumed to never end. The sets of the times in the history 
of each world are disjoint .. A world alld t.ime are a "sit.uation." A 8Cel/fl " "io 
at a world and time is any maximal set of times containing the given time, 
ami all times that are iIi a particular future of it; i.e., a scenario is any single 
branch of the history of the world that begins at the given time, and contains 
all times ill some linear subrelatioll of <. Different scenarios correspond to 
different ways in which the world may develop as a result of the actions of 
agents. The times in the non-overlapping parts of scenarios are incomparable 
,b.y <, but. one can assign dock values to t.hem to compare them, and make 
sense of expressions such a.s "noo11.'· 1 shall not include these here for reasons 
of space. Evell though a world may develop in several different ways. only 
one scenario can be actualized. An agent may do anyone of several basic 
act.iolls at. any world and t.ime; this along with other agent.:; , actiolls and 
events in the environment determine which scenario is actualized. 
1 take e0111mits as a primitive notion here and consider intention as de-
rived. ('01l1111it8(;r,p, c) Illeans t.hat. agent. :1' is committed to achieving 7) t.o 
a level of c. Then Jntends(:r,p) == (:3c > 0: C:011111lits( :r,p, c)). Even though 
commitments can be of different degrees, these degrees just represent the en-
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trenchment of the corresponding intention- an intention itself is treated as 
being either 0 N or 0 F F , i.e. , as binary. This is crucial since the motivational 
component 6f intentions , which is what makes agents act for them, is needed 
fully. if at all- how much effort an agent expends for something is a different 
matter. 
Each agent deliberates from time to time. Deliberates(;r) is true at pre-
cisely the situations where ;1" deliberates. The process of deliberation is not 
studied here; however, commit.ments are assigned by it. For commitments, 
this theory applies only between successive deliberations on any scenario. 
Each action when done at a given time along a given scenario has a certain 
cost attached to it- this cost can vary between different instances of the 
same action, and equals the value of Cost( :r, a) on a given world, time and 
scenario. The function U tility( " .) applies to an agent and a condition, and 
takes into account the objective chance of different scenarios on which that 
condit.ion is t.rue. 
Another useful primitive is ading for an intention: an agent acts for an 
intention when his action is a part of what he would do in order to satisfy 
(\.I) intent.ion. Acting for an int.elltion is a cognit.ive concept- it. depends 011 
the agent's internal state rather than the world. An a.gent acting for an 
intention may be doing so even if it would be impossible or unlikely for him 
t.o ever slIcceed by doing that act.ion. The sarne action could be done for 
two different intentions; of course, several distinct a.nd temporally isolated 
actions may have to be dOlle for a siugle intention. I notate this cOllcept as a. 
three place predicate Ads-for(·,·,·): the first argument. of which'is an agent. 
ickJl t.ifier; Ute second the basic action done; and the third the condition acted 
for. In order to connect. the agent's cognitive state with t.he world. I assume 
t.hat au agent who ads for a condition intends it, and also i~nmediately 
performs the action by which he acts for that condition. PrecomJl1itments , 
not.at.ed Prerommit.t.ed, are discllssed in §7. 
Commitments, precommitments and beliefs are given a simple semantics 
for ease of exposition, and to focus on the matters of interest- a Commits, 
Preco11l111it.t.t'cl, Beiie\'es or Ad;s-[or formula is true over a subscenario or 
int.erval if it belongs to the agent's cognitive st.ate during that subscenario. 
Agents can have beliefs and intentions that involve objective probability and 
utilit.y statements. In t.he following, Ap denotes "for all scenarios through this 
situation ]1". E == -.A-.. Pp means "]I holds somet.imes in the past ." F]I, pUq, 
(a)p all apply on a given scenarios and mean , respectively. that "eventually 
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p holds," "eventually q holds and p holds until then" and "action a is done 
and pholds as soon as it is done." 
6 Commitment Formalized 
Several important properties of intent.ions, e.g ., that an agent who has one 
must evellt.lla.l ly ad for it unless he redeliberates ill the mealltime, can be 
formalized in the framework as presented above. Many of these are given in 
[Singh, 1991a] and are not repeated here. One of those that we need here is 
that acting for an intention "uses up" a part of the resources allocated to it. 
Here t.he metaphor of commitment as a measure of the rf'sources committed 
to an intention is invoked. As the agent does actions for his intention, he 
uses up resources for it, and it becolllf's progressively less entrenched. Finally 
when his commitment for the intention. is no longer positive, the agent will no 
longer be required to act for achif'ving it. He might reinstate that intent.ion, 
i.e., adopt an intention for the same condition or task again. If he does so, 
he will again have a positive commitment to it and will be able to do some 
actiollS for it. 
1. A[((.'ommits(:r,p,c) 1\ Acts-fol'(:r,a,p) 1\ Cost(:r, a) = 1I)-t 
(a) (.'ol11wits( ;/:,1', C - l/.)] 
Constraint 2 says that when an intent.ion is believed to have succf'eded, 
the agent would eventually deliberate. This is satisfied if the agent deliberates 
repeatedly. 
2. A[Intends(;1', p) A Believes( ;r ,p)-t F Deliberates( ;1') ] 
Constraiut 3 says that if an agent deliberates and adopts an intention, 
his commitment to that intention equals what he believes is his objectively 
expected utility of achieving that condition sometimes in the future. He does 
not have to commit to achieving every useful condition. 
:3. A[(Deliberates(:r)ACommits(;r.p,e)Ac> O)-t Believes(;/:, Utility(;r, Fp) 
= e)] 
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7 Precommitment Formalized 
Now I tum t.o a formalization of t.he notion of precomlllitment in the same 
framework. Let. Precommi tted(;r,]1, c) mean that. agent :r has precommit.ted 
to achieving ]J to the extent of c. 
7.1 Precommitment by Deliberative Inertia 
This is the kind of precommitlll(,llt where the agent on adopting a precommit-
ment., simply does not reconsider the corresponding commitment as often as 
he might have done otherwise; e.g ., an agent may vote for his political part)', 
even if he does not rate its candidat.e very highly. Thus when an agent is pre-
committed to achieving a certain condition, he would possibly allocate more 
resources t.o it than he would have otherwise. The precollunitmellt simply 
represents t.he minimum resources t.hat would be assigned t.o the task. I now 
r('define the commitments assigned by an agent to an intention to take into 
accoullt the precommit.ments he might have. The following definition shows 
hO\'I: precommitnlf'nt.s can override t.he CUITent deliberations of an agent.. 
4. A[( Deliberates( :r)I\Believes(.r. UtiJit.v( :r. F]l) = c)I\Precommitted( :r.]1. d) 
--t Commit.s(:r,]1, max( c, d)))] 
7.2 Precommitment by Elimination of Options 
Instead of relying on deliberative inertia, an agent may exhibit his preCOlll-
mit.Illf'Ilt.s by simply eliminating certaill options, the availahilit.y of which 
llIight. at. a lat.er time "tempt." him t.o consider giving up a commitment too 
early. An agent may thus "burn his bridges" so to speak and lose the option 
he 'v"ould other\vise have of crossing them. In the refrigerator example of 
§·L, til(' agent. exhibits his precommitnwllt, not. by decreasing the resources 
allocated t.o t.he relevant intention, but. by making the actions available for 
achieving it more expensive: he would now need to pry open the refrigerator 
door. or first locate the key. Thus relative to the costs of the task, its utility 
is Il\odifif'd. Conversely. all agent. may do actions t.hat. would later make cer-
t.ain iut.ent.ions more attractive. i.c .. increase their ut.ility to him then; e.g., 
someOIlf' may leave his wallet in his office to make sure he returns later to 
pick it. lip. Thus he would have t.o go t.o his office for his wallet, even if he 
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would not have gone otherwise. This case is considered below. A 11 agc>nt 
with precoml11itment el for p does an action of net cost e, but after which his 
. utility for p increases by d - f . 
)). Pl'ecommitted(;r,p. el) /\ Believes(;r , Utility( :r, Fp) = c)~ 
(:Ja: Helieves(:r , Cost(;r, a) - Utility(J', (a)--,Fp) = e) /\ (a)true/\ 
Beliel'es( .r, (a) Utility(:r, Fp) = c + d - e )) 
8 Conditional Commitment and 
Conative Policies 
Another form of commit.ment. t.hat is relevant to limited rational agents may 
be dubbed conditional comm.itmfllt. This is a commitment that an agent. 
would have for an intention or task, 'were a certain condition t.o ohtain. It. 
should be noted tlJat a conditional cOlllmitment in q relative to jJ is different 
from a commitment in the condi t ional expression p~ q. The former leads 
to a commitment on part of the agent (for q) only when the antecedent, p, 
becollles true; t.1l(" latter holds auyway. The fonner may only he satisfied by 
achieving qj the latter may also be satisfied by achieving --p, i.e., by [naking 
l)~ q vacuously t.rue. Also, the former is really a nested commitment., i.e ., a 
commitlllent t.o have a cf'rtain cOl1l1nitn1f'llt. It is easy to see that conditional 
commitment generalizes the not.ion of precommitment. 
Conditional commitments control the conmlitments that an agent can 
come to adopt when he deliberates. They can thus be seen as embodying 
certain kinds of conah"e policifs t.hat an agent might have. Conativp poli-
cies, akin to their well-known cousin, epistemic policies, are about the kiuds 
of iutentions an agent would adopt uuder various circumstances. One cau 
impose constrains on the conative policies of agents, e.g., to prevent them 
from adopt.ing int.entions which t.hey believe are mutually incollsistent. or iu-
consistent with their beliefs. Conative policies are best framed as different 
kinds of rationality postulates on an agent's intentions. The conative policips 
Pll1bodipd in an agpnt. do not. challgp dup t.o ord inary deliherat.ions. DplibNa-
tions of a deeper nature. on par with value assignments, are needed to ('l'(:'ate 
and modify them. 
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9 Conclusions and Future Work 
COlllll1itnlents and precol1ll1litments are important aspects of rational agency 
in human beings. The theory presented here is sufficiently abstract to capture 
our essential intuit.ions about these concepts. It is suggested that commit-
ments and precommitments a.re important components of any descriptive 
theory of rationality in limitf'd agent.s, such as humans. This motivates t.iwir 
lise ill prf'script.ive theories for AI a.gents, whose resource linut.a.t.iolls Ca.llllOt 
be neglected. In particula.r, it is proposed that commitments be analyzed as 
the resources that an agent ought to allocate to different tasks. This leads 
t.o sOllie illt.eresting properties of commitments, and turns out, t.o be powerful 
enough to formalize preconlll1itments with. Thus progress is made towards 
a clearer understanding the rationality of limited agents. 
Fut.ure work planned includes forma.lly expressing rationality post.ulat.f's 
t.ha.t. relat.e planning and intentions and to consider nested applicat.ions of it. , 
as required for plan recognition. These would be done by considering several 
kinds of int.erest.ing conative policies. Another interesting idea is to define 
habit.s as sequences of actions whose cost is lower than the Sllll1 of the costs 
of the individual actions that compose them. 
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